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ABSTRACT
The starting point of this study is the perspective offered 
by Emilio Gentile on modern “politics as religion”. 
This vantage point is briefly illustrated by the case of 
contemporary “popular Confucianism”. However, in 
order to show the extent to which the Chinese religious 
situation does not lend itself readily to such an approach, 
the author considers a “popular” cult that reemerged in 
China after Maoism, namely, the widespread veneration 
of five entities: Heaven, Earth, Sovereign, Ancestors, 
Masters (tian, di, jun, qin, shi). Comparing modern 
interpretations (whether political, scholarly or popular) 
of these practices sheds some light on the problematic 
nature of secularizing projects targeting this enduring 
cosmological vision..
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1. gentile and tHe coMParativiSt SPace
What holds for many sociological theories when 
they are applied to non-Western cultural universes 
also holds for Emilio Gentile's extensive writings 
on “politics as religion”. A twofold gesture seems 
inevitable. First, one must recognize the necessarily 
limited relevance of such theories, if for no other 
reason than because of the already centuries old 
transformation of these universes on contact with 
the modern West: from this minimalist perspective, 
European theoreticians studying a foreign reality 
recognize what seem familiar phenomena (nation, 
citizenship, secularization) for the simple reason that 
these phenomena are themselves of partly European 
derivation. One must next take stock of what such 
an interpretive discourse leaves unexplained about 
behavior due to notions and attitudes that are 
difficult to transpose from one universe to the next. 
Once the vanity of a meta-discourse claiming to 
directly address a universal phenomenon or contrast 
the proposed theory with an indigenous theory that 
fails to take into consideration the generalized 
hybridity of the contemporary world is recognized, 
this second step of the investigation can take the 
form of a simple reflexive return: this emphasizes 
concrete experiences in contextualized manner 
while recognizing their specificity and resistance 
to generalization. This does not interrupt the 
discussion but rather reopens it. In other words, the 
work of Emilio Gentile opens the way for a general 
comparativism regarding the modern forms of the 
“sacralization of politics”: “By a religion of politics 
I mean a particular form of sacralization of politics 
that has occurred in the modern era after the political 
realm had gained its independence from traditional 
religion. By taking over the religious dimension 
and acquiring a sacred status, politics went so far as 
to claim for itself the prerogative to determine the 
meaning and fundamental aim of human existence 
for individuals and the collectivity, at least on this 
earth. A religion of politics is created every time a 
political entity such as a nation, state, race, class, 
party or movement is transformed into a sacred 
entity, which means it becomes transcendent, 
unchallengeable, and intangible”1. As such, Gentile 
points out, this entity asserts itself as the center of 
a system of beliefs and practices that make it an 
object of faith and worship – indeed, sometimes of 
devotion to the point of sacrifice.
Within these “religions of politics”, Gentile 
recognizes two major types according to their 
attitude towards traditional religion and the 
manner in which they govern relations between 
the individual and the state. In civil religions, 
the sacralization of a political entity adapts to a 
system that champions the pluralism of ideas and 
the religious freedom of individuals. Political 
religions, by contrast, “sacralize a political 
system based on an irrevocable monopoly of 
power, ideological monism, the obligatory and 
unconditional subordination of the individual and 
the collectivity to its laws”. These are ideal-types, 
of course, that respectively characterize pluralistic, 
democratic societies and totalitarian ones2.
2. wHat ForMS do religionS aS 
PoliticS take in cHina ?
 
What advantage is to be had from adopting 
this typology in the Chinese case? Perhaps that 
of offering an unusual perspective on relations 
between the political and the religious over the 
course of the past century. From this perspective, 
the collapse of the ritualistic order of the Empire in 
1911 ushered in a new era propitious to the gradual 
development of specifically Chinese “religions of 
politics” since the ultimate legitimacy of political 
power no longer found its source in Heaven but 
in the People or in the Nation. The categorical 
distinction proposed by Gentile would allow one 
to lay out, for purely heuristic purposes, a new 
periodization for a century-old evolution. One might 
thus distinguish between three main situations: 
prior to and following a particularly striking case of 
“political religion” (that of the Maoist totalitarian 
1 Gentile, Emilio,  Politics as Religion. (Princeton University Press, 2006), XIV.
2 Gentile, Emilio, Les religions de la politique. Entre démocraties et totalitarismes, 
(Paris: Le Seuil, 2005), 14-16 (All references refer to the French edition used by the 
author). In order to avoid possible ambiguity, one must take into consideration the 
fact that, in Gentile’s conceptualization, the “sacralization of politics” is a modern 
phenomenon that differs from the very general phenomenon of the “sacralization 
of political power” encountered in most pre-modern societies – the Chinese empire, 
for example. What’s more – and within the modern perspective itself – it also must 
not be confused with the politicization of religion, where religious movements seek 
to apply their program within or with the help of the state machine, as in certain 
manifestations of Islamism (Ibid., 14, 17, 261).
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regime), various efforts to elaborate a civil religion 
centered on the construction of the new Chinese 
nation would be observable. Particular importance 
would be accorded the nationalist period of the 
1920s-30s on the mainland, due both to the creation 
of secular rituals by the Guomindang state and 
the transformations affecting society taken as a 
whole (such as the emergence of mass religious 
organizations)3. On this view, the political religion 
established by the communist state on the continent 
violently interrupted a nationalist civil religion of 
this type4. Under the governments of Chiang Kai-
shek 蔣介石 and Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國, an 
authoritarian form of the latter was then partly 
transported to Taiwan.
If one accepts such a perspective, the problem then 
becomes the following: how should one formulate 
the question of the construction of civil religion 
as Gentile understood it in the two contexts of the 
decay of Maoist totalitarianism on the mainland and 
the democratization of the old nationalist system in 
Taiwan? More precisely, what is the relationship 
between the present day attempts of these two states 
(post-totalitarian Beijing, post-authoritarian Taipei) 
at politico-religious reconstruction and the heritage 
left over from the interwar Republican period, the 
importance of which I have underscored? It is clear 
that the two states occupy very different positions 
in regards to this Republican experience. Under 
the Maoist regime, it was largely silenced and it 
is only gradually that it has afterwards received 
attention in academic circles and become the 
object of public discussion in the PRC. The same 
does not hold for the island: after the evacuation 
by the Japanese authorities, religious discourses 
and movements originating on the continent gained 
a foothold in Taiwanese society despite the tight 
control exercised by the nationalist state, which 
had established martial law. As soon as the latter 
was lifted in 1987, these discourses and movements 
took new forms and rapidly expanded. Sometimes, 
they rediscovered unexpected continuities with 
the heritage of Republican China, a paradoxical 
situation given that these partial elements of 
continuity emerged within a society claiming 
an identity both  democratic and specifically 
Taiwanese.
3 For an initial consideration of all of the problems relating to the history and 
anthropology of religion in modern China, see the survey by Goossaert, Palmer 
(2011).
4 This hypothesis cannot take into account the complexity of the historic situation, 
in particular the division of China under the warlords and the evolution of the 
nationalist regime.
3. an exaMPle: tHe MultiPle FateS oF 
PoPular conFucianiSM
Let us try to give an example of these complicated 
historical relations. On mainland China, the 
2000s witnessed the emergence of assertive 
movements claiming to represent popular 
Confucianism (minjian rujia 民間儒家): Far from 
official initiatives, these undertakings particularly 
developed in the educational (the creation of 
schools centered on Classic texts) and religious 
(the re-creation of collective rituals at various 
scales) domains. Those who provided the driving 
force for these movements – new educators and 
new ritualists – were drawn from the urban lower 
middle classes and sometimes consisted of former 
Communist Party officials. At the national level, 
internet use facilitated the creation of unstructured 
and sometimes ephemeral networks to promote 
group reading of Confucian texts, participation 
in rituals and, less frequently, the creation of 
communal living spaces. Without always explicitly 
laying claim to a religious identity, which would 
not have been recognized by the authorities, these 
movements emphasized ultimate values 
of the Confucian heritage that focused 
on individual and collective destiny 
(anshen liming 安生立命)5.
It is a minority phenomenon that appears 
to have little significance in statistical terms. 
Nevertheless, setting it in the context of the 
various “religions of politics” that have appeared 
in contemporary China allows one to cast light 
on its real significance. It is tempting to compare 
these mainland movements to contemporary 
developments in Taiwan. As Richard Madsen has 
shown, following the Guomindang authoritarian 
state’s relative withdrawal from the public sphere, 
new mass organizations were able to contribute 
to the construction of a democratic culture in the 
context of a veritable “religious renaissance” in the 
late 1980s6. These organizations, which recruited 
hundreds of thousands of members among the new 
urban classes, often referred to Buddhist ideals of 
compassion and social solidarity but also promoted 
a Confucian ethos and values such as “Filial 
piety” (孝道). Forms of popular Confucianism 
thus developed within Taiwanese society, not just 
around the respect of shared values, but also around 
shared rituals. These ritualistic aspects were also 
(and are still) encouraged by the development of 
a syncretistic religion: Yiguandao (一貫道) or Way 
of Pervading Unity. Due to its attitude towards the 
5 For more on these matters, see Billioud and Thoraval (2014).
6 Madsen (2007).
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Japanese occupation, the Yiguandao was in the past 
repressed by the Nationalist and Communist Party 
and reduced to a clandestine existence. With more 
than a million followers, it now ranks as Taiwan’s 
“third religion” after Buddhism and Taoism. 
Yiguandao chose to emphasize the Confucian side 
of its teachings, which it spreads via collective 
study of the Classics appropriating methods of 
reading and memorization that are also encountered 
among mainland movements. On both sides of the 
Strait, these anti-intellectualist methods, which 
seek to incorporate the Confucian message via 
lived experience, today owe much to a Taiwanese 
educator, Wang Caigui 王財貴. Despite differences 
of scale, parallels thus already exist between these 
various Confucian-inspired movements.
But the perspective opened up by a triple succession 
of Chinese forms of the “politics as religion” 
(civil religion/political religion/civil religions) 
also strengthens the necessity to examine the past 
and future of popular Confucianism on mainland 
China. This is for two reasons. First, small 
mainland organizations such as Yidan xuetang (一
耽學堂) and powerful churches such as Yiguandao 
both have roots in the Republican period: they are 
the direct or indirect heirs of the mass organizations 
– the “redemptive societies” lately rediscovered by 
the historiography – that emerged after the fall of 
the Empire. These organizations (“Way of Anterior 
Heaven”, “Association for Universal Morality” and 
so on) in various ways combined a desire to moralize 
society with individual and collective aspirations to 
salvation and were sometimes joined by scholars 
literati who had been left without prospects by the 
abolition of the imperial system.
Of course, the rediscovery and re-appropriation of 
this shared religious past is more difficult on the 
mainland than in Taiwan. On the one hand, the 
development in Taiwan of powerful, ecumenically-
inclined religious organizations appealing to ancient 
Chinese teachings contributed to the construction 
of what Madsen calls the Taiwanese civil religion 
(in a sense that is not so different from Bellah’s 
understanding of this concept). According to him, 
the process of democratization thoroughly linked 
these organizations with the rise of a new pluralist 
political culture. Despite the many religious 
currents cutting across Chinese society, none of 
which enjoy legal institutional recognition, such 
a phenomenon is impossible in mainland China 
given the Communist Party’s tireless imposition 
of the official counter-religion known as atheism 
or “the non-existence of spirits” (wushenlun 無神
論). There are indications, however – for example, 
recent contacts between the Communist Party and 
Yiguandao for what are presented as educational 
or patriotic purposes – that a highly varied and 
perhaps surprising future is in store for “popular 
Confucianism”7.
In short, to limit ourselves to Mainland China 
history, Gentile’s typology offers an interesting 
perspective, allowing comparison between three 
major periods. An initial civil religion specific to the 
Republican period and centered on the authoritarian 
nationalism of Guomindang did not impede a 
Confucian religiosity organized on the basis of 
mass associations from developing in society. By 
contrast, the violently exclusive communist political 
religion, which focused on class, party and leader, 
banned any positive reference to Confucianism 
from state and society. Finally, with the weakening 
of totalitarian structures and in a context marked by 
the global rise of Chinese power, a new authoritarian 
ideology has gradually emerged that borrows some 
symbols from the Chinese cultural tradition (does 
this amount to a new form of civil religion in the 
Gentile’s sense of the term?). This has only allowed 
minor growth on the part of Confucian-inspired 
popular movements, as if the present moment 
was merely a period of transition towards a future 
for which Taiwan supplies the model or, on the 
contrary, the counter-model. 
Having taken the notion of “politics as 
religion” as far as it will go – albeit 
at the cost of a certain abstraction 
– I would like to consider the reasons 
why this perspective leaves the observer 
somewhat dissatisfied, as if essential aspects 
of Chinese reality have been neglected8. 
7 Billioud, Thoraval (2014), 390-398. On Yiguandao, see Billioud, Thoraval (2015) 
and Billioud, Qi Jia (2016).
8 This reflexive return is not in itself a criticism of Gentile’s general theory, which 
moreover specifies the limits of his concept: “If one adopts a broader point of view, 
one will observe that, in contemporary history, the problem of the sacralization of 
politics embraces a much vaster and more complex reality than the religions of 
politics that have achieved an institutional form would seem to indicate,” Gentile 
(2005), 266-267.
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4. a Forgotten worSHiP: Heaven, eartH, 
Sovereign, anceStorS, MaSterS
One may begin with might seem an observation of 
little importance. In the homes of Chinese villagers, 
one today still finds five entities that are the object 
of domestic worship. The names of these entities 
were formerly written on a ritual tablet that was 
placed on a little altar in front of a table of offerings 
where a perfume burner stood. Despite prohibitions 
and destruction, these inscriptions reappeared at 
the end of the Maoist period but often on more 
humble material: instead of a tablet, there might be 
a simple piece of paper on which the five characters 
had been calligraphed.
From top to bottom, one there reads the following 
words: Heaven, Earth, Sovereign, Ancestors, 
Masters (tian 天, di 地, jun 君, qin 親, shi 師). A 
scale thus seems to be established that runs from 
several major figures of the social order to cosmic 
beings. Following the Maoist period of forced 
amnesia, in the 1980s many Chinese intellectuals 
wondered about the object of this worship, which 
had become less familiar than that of the ancestors 
or local deities9. The problem was more historical 
than semantic in nature: what were the origins of 
this form of worship and, above all, how had it 
spread throughout the population?
9 Thus, in 1983, the specialist of literature Zhang Bilai ranked among the “three 
questions without answers” (sanwen sanbuzhi 三問三不知) why the Masters 
were present of on these tablets (the “five social relations” of Confucianism 
including the friend, for example, but not the master) as well as the reason and 
origin of their association with Heaven and Earth (1983), 25-26.
It is interesting in this connection to consider the 
personal experience of Yu Yingshi 余英時, widely 
recognized as one of the leading figures of Chinese 
intellectual history. 
In 1937, when war broke out with Japan, Yu 
Yingshi, then aged seven, took refuge with his 
uncle in the mountainous district of Qianshan 潛
山 (southern province of Anhui). Until 1947, he 
lived in a remote village society far removed from 
the upheavals of the time. “I am convinced,” he 
wrote in a short text recounting his experience, 
“that what I experienced at the time in this village 
of Guanzhuang 官庄 was not fundamentally 
different from the situation that existed one or 
two centuries before, except there was a greater 
degree of dereliction and poverty”. In the absence 
of any modern educational structure, he attended 
traditional schools (sishu 私塾), where Confucian 
teachings based on the Four Books were dispensed. 
“A Confucianism, a Daoism and a Buddhism that 
had become customary continued to supply the 
foundation of the villagers’ beliefs and behaviors.”
In the case of Yu Yingshi, who would later become 
a professor at Yale and Princeton, this existence on 
the margins of modern China makes it possible to 
“understand the meaning of the Chinese 
cultural tradition from within.” “Rather 
ironically,” he notes, “Chen Duxiu 
陳獨秀, an extremely critical and 
satirical spirit and a leader of the May 
Fourth 1919 movement, was a native of the 
neighboring canton of Huaining 懷寧”10. But 
the new culture propagated by this movement 
(which, against Confucianism, claimed “science and 
democracy” as its inspiration) had yet to reach the 
remote villages where Yu Yingshi lived. The latter 
had only heard this literatus-turned-revolutionary 
spoken of in connection with scandalous remarks: 
“the first time I heard his name, it was because he 
was accused of having said that ‘the father and 
mother are first of all motivated by desire, not by 
the intention of having a child’. He is said to have 
later declared that filial piety was the worst of evils 
and the source of all vices.”
One day – it was Chinese New Year’s – the child for 
the first time watched as his uncle used a brush to 
write large characters on red paper:
Vertically written in the midst of these parallel maxims 
(duilian 對聯) were the words: Heaven, Earth, 
State, Ancestors, Masters. They were arranged 
on the wall at the back of the room where the 
ancestor tablets were located. My uncle explained 
10 Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) was a promoter of the movement for vernacular language 
and one of the leaders of the May Fourth 1919 movement at Peking University. He 
was also a co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.
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the origin to me: the five characters should be 
“Heaven, Earth, Sovereign, Ancestors, Masters” 
but, since we were now under the Republican 
regime, there no longer was an emperor and as 
a result the character jun 君 (sovereign) had been 
replaced with the character guo 國 (country, state). 
This change of character was already indicative of 
a phenomenon of modernization and yet, in a very 
obvious way, the system of values in its structure had not 
changed. These five characters were precisely what, on 
the eve of the May Fourth Movement, Chen Duxiu called 
for completely eradicating: “most of the characters of the 
writing used in our society,” he wrote, “still bear the mark 
of the horrible customs of the monarchical period. In the 
main rooms of villagers’ homes is to be found a poster 
or tablet with the characters Heaven, Earth, Sovereign, 
Ancestors, Masters written on it. These completely 
decrepit ideas are spread across the entire country. This 
is why, if we sincerely wish to strengthen the Republic, 
it is indispensable to rid ourselves of them, to completely 
wash ourselves of these old ideas that continue to be 
spread by ethics and literature and are contrary to the 
republican spirit.”
Yu Yingshi readily notes the ancient association of 
these five notions, which stretches back to Chinese 
antiquity, particularly in the book of the philosopher 
Xunzi (IIIrd-century BCE), who is well known among 
men of letters. Xunzi sees in the worship of these 
entities the three roots of rites: Heaven and Earth 
are the foundations of life; the Ancestors are the 
foundation of family continuity; and the Sovereign 
and Masters are the foundation of the social order11. 
The question, however, is to determine when the 
worship of these entities became a popular practice 
imbuing the most modest levels of society. Yu 
Yingshi recognizes that this practice is not ancient 
and could not have predated the Song Dynasty12. 
But a more recent study offers greater precision. It 
was only at the end of the Ming Dynasty that ritual 
worship of these five figures became genuinely 
popular, although questions remain as to the place 
reserved for the master (shi 師): can the latter 
legitimately be included in a single group alongside 
Heaven and the emperor? This is why it was only 
in the eighteenth-century, following an edict from 
Manchu Emperor Yongzheng, that this practice 
was formally institutionalized. Yet the master 
thus designated explicitly became the Supreme 
Master – i.e., Confucius himself. The government’s 
promotion of this form of worship was part of a 
larger policy seeking to moralize and Confucianize 
the entire social body. In particular, observance of 
this ritual was made obligatory in schools, from the 
district level to that of the Imperial Academy13.
Following the fall of the Empire, the gradual decline 
of the small traditional schools (sishu 私塾) and 
the complete destruction of these rituals in 
communities and families under Maoism, 
it is not surprising that, beginning 
in the 1980s, the inscriptions 
perpetuating this ancient reverence 
for a cosmological order – one that had 
imbued centuries of Chinese history – only 
reappeared at the domestic level.
11  « Les rites ont, en fait, trois fondements. Le Ciel et la Terre sont le fondement 
de la vie. Les premiers ancêtres sont le fondement de la race. Le prince 
et le maître sont le fondement de l’ordre social. Sans le Ciel et la Terre, 
comment y aurait-il une vie ? Sans les premiers ancêtres, comment y aurait-
il une descendance ? Sans prince ni maître, comment y aurait-il un ordre 
social ? S’il venait à manquer un seul de ces trois fondements, il n’y aurait 
aucun homme en sécurité ici bas. C’est pourquoi les rites permettent de 
servir le Ciel en haut, la Terre en bas, d’honorer le premier ancêtre et de 
vénérer le Prince et les maîtres. Tels sont les trois fondements des rites» 
Le Blanc, Mathieu (2009), 1076-1077. 《荀子·禮論篇》：禮有三本：天地者，
生之本也；先祖者，類之本也；君師者，治之本也。無天地，惡生？無先祖，惡
出？無君師，惡治？三者偏亡焉，無安人。故上事天，下事地，尊先祖而隆君
師。是禮之三本也…… (Ritual principles have three roots. Heaven and Earth 
are the root of life. Forebears are the root of kinship. Lords and teachers are the 
root of order. Were there no heaven and no Earth, how could there be life? Were 
there no forebears, how could there be issue? Were there no lords and no teachers, 
how could there be order? Were even one of these three lost, there would be no 
peace and security for man. Thus, rituals serve Heaven above and Earth below, pay 
honor to one's forebears, and exalt rules and teachers, for these are the three roots of 
ritual principles. )  Xunzi, Knoblock, John ( transl.), A Translation and Study of the 
Complete Works. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988–1994), Vol. 3, p. 58.
12  Yu Yingshi (2014).
13  Xu Zi (2006).
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5. coSMology and tHe Place oF PoliticS
In the eyes of one observer, the plural and 
hierarchized object of this worship seems to 
have a twofold character. On the one hand, what 
we recognize as the political dimension seems 
to occupy central place: a Sovereign (jun) and 
then State (guo) appears to play a mediating role 
between Heaven and Earth and the other figures 
representing kinship or the teaching of culture 
(Ancestors, Masters). It must not be forgotten that 
these practices were propagated by the systematic 
action of the imperial state. On the other hand, this 
political entity is not separable from the four other 
entities to which it is related via a symbolic-type 
association and the ritual activity that addresses 
them as a group.
To return to the Gentile’s problematic: to what 
extent can the major division that is the condition 
of possibility for “religions of politics” – that is, 
secularization and the great division of the world 
it always implies in one way or another – occur 
here? For it is only after the political domain has 
been separated from the religious universe that, as 
if in return, the various modern phenomena of the 
sacralization of politics can take place14. 
One may attempt to capture the main difficulty in 
one word. The Chinese cosmological tradition is in 
no way homogenous but it resists application of a 
Western-origin distinction that would dualistically 
contrast the earthly and the heavenly or irreducibly 
material and spiritual domains. The various 
differentiations performed there are not susceptible 
to reduction to a difference of “altitude” between, 
for example, the transcendent Heaven and the 
inferior world of men. At each level of the cosmic 
hierarchy, the principal difference is between 
the visible and invisible dimensions of a single 
universe in perpetual interaction: the dynamism of 
the yin and the yang permeates all beings, which 
are delimited and separate in Western eyes. Thus, 
what is expressed by ancestors (qin 親) on the tablet 
of the domestic ritual does not refer to beings who 
have become absent. In truth, this qin designates a 
familial or lineal continuity between the living and 
the dead: the latter continue to be present, although 
14  Without necessarily associating them with a rigid causal determinism, Gentile 
takes care to enumerate the various phenomena that precede or coexist with the 
emergence of “religions of politics”: “With the affirmation, in the modern period, 
of the superiority of national sovereignty, the secularization of culture, the church’s 
loss of hegemony over the state as well as the triumph of the principle of popular 
sovereignty and the birth of mass politics, the relationship between the religious 
sphere and the political sphere, government and the sacred, evolves and enters into 
a new phase that will give birth to phenomena of sacralization of politics” (2005) 
15. One must naturally examine each of these terms to assess the degree to which 
they account for phenomena that are at once comparable and nevertheless specific 
in the Chinese domain.
in an invisible form, and are partners in the ritual 
exchange (offerings for protection) of ancestor 
worship. The master (shi) is not necessarily a living 
master; the master may also be the ancient sages 
who, though now distant in time and invisible, 
can once again be made present like any spirit by 
means of sacrifice. In other words, if it is difficult to 
clearly demarcate the secular and religious aspects 
of the world, it is because the cosmology in which 
human action seeks to orient itself is organized in 
keeping with analogical chains driven by a common 
dynamism (of which the yin and the yang is the 
most recognizable illustration)15. Macroscopic 
and smaller entities like the human body are thus 
conceived in terms of the same categories and 
processes (energy, dispersion/concentration, etc.). 
As Chinese medicine continues to demonstrate to 
this day, it is difficult to naturalistically differentiate 
between matters of physiology, psychology and 
spirituality as they pertain to the body.
For all that, it cannot be denied that more than a 
century of exchanges, revolutions and wars has 
undermined this traditional Chinese cosmology. 
Entire, doubtlessly decisive portions of the 
experience of the Chinese individual are governed 
by a naturalistic logic and instrumental 
rationality reflected in the power of 
technology, the strength of political and 
economic management techniques and 
so on. Therefore, the question of what 
has withstood these now global processes 
and makes it possible to defend and reconstruct 
symbols and practical schemata characteristic of 
older behaviors is always to be raised in a highly 
contextual and hypothetical manner. 
6. a State religion? tHe PHiloSoPHerS’ 
reSPonSe
As is usually the case, the domestic worship of the 
five entities is subject to a number of interpretations, 
both past and present. Under the Empire, the 
importance ascribed to each of these entities has not 
always been the same. Yu Yingshi has shown how 
the category of master was promoted by Confucian 
scholars-literati in the Song period as well as by 
brigands revolting against the imperial order (the 
master being the rebel leader) in novels such as 
Water Margin16.
What today seems the most political category – that 
15  This cosmology, named as “continuist” in The Sage and the People: The Confucian 
Revival in China, corresponds rather well to what the anthropologist Philippe 
Descola (2005) termed, in opposition to the naturalism of the modern West, 
“analogist ontology.”
16  Yu Yingshi (2004), 130-131.
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of the Sovereign (jun) – was in fact politico-
religious in nature since the emperor was at once 
monarch and the great priest in charge of the cult 
to Heaven. The anecdote recounted by Yu Yingshi 
showed how, under the Republic, the sovereign 
was replaced by the State (guo). In the eyes of 
revolutionary intellectuals like Chen Duxiu, this 
Republican state was entirely secular. But it is 
interesting to note that the intrusion of a national 
state into the ancient cosmological order was bound 
to raise questions among modern intellectuals 
who remained committed to Confucian ideals. In 
particular, the philosophical movement generally 
referred to as contemporary neo-Confucianism, 
which emerged on the mainland under the Republic 
before taking refuge in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
following the Communist takeover, sought to give 
contemporary meaning to its teaching by reducing it 
to its ethical and religious dimensions: indirect heirs 
of the ideals of the May Fourth Movement (“science 
and democracy”), these intellectuals opposed any 
authoritarian interpretation of culture (whether that 
of Mao Zedong or Chiang Kai-shek). They saw the 
promotion of a form of worship that took the national 
state apparatus as its object as threatening their ideal 
of wisdom. Since they moreover remained deeply 
committed to the cosmological continuity extolled 
by the neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming 
dynasties, they felt a need to correct the names of 
the entities that were worshipped within what had 
become a domestic religion.
From this point of view, this memory of Cai Renhou 
蔡仁厚, a disciple of the philosopher Mou Zongsan 
牟宗三, is revealing:
The tablet devoted to Heaven, Earth, Sovereign, 
Ancestors and Masters was found everywhere among 
families in ancient society. But when there was no 
longer an emperor, what was he to be replaced with? 
At the start of the Republican period, some suggested 
the country or State (guo) but the State (guojia 國家) 
is a political organization and it is not a suitable object 
of cultural reverence. Others suggested replacing it 
with man (ren 人) in his relationship with Heaven and 
Earth. But it was too vague as an entity, too abstract 
for the purposes of worship. Confronted with this 
problem, Tang Junyi later suggested that the inscription 
be corrected by using the character for wise man or 
saint (sheng 聖). In 1956, when Mou Zongsan took a 
position at Tonghai University 東海 (in Taizhong 臺
中, Taiwan), we prepared a tablet dedicated to Heaven,  
Earth, Saints, Ancestors and Masters for the New Year, 
burned incense and performed a ritual. The next day, 
Xu Fuguan came with his children to pay his respects 
to Mou Zongsan. He saw the tablet and praised it 
highly, which deeply impressed me”17.
17  Cai Renhou (2009). Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909-1978), Mou Zongsan (1909-
1995) and Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1902-1982) are three leading thinkers 
of contemporary neo-Confucianism. On Mou Zongsan, see Thoraval 
(2003) and Billioud (2012).
The attitude of these philosophers thus consisted in as it 
were bracketing a State already modern in operational and 
ideological terms18. The holy spirits who interpose 
themselves between Heaven and Earth and 
human communities are sages of Chinese 
history (Confucius and his disciples as well 
as the great scholars of the later dynasties). 
Emphasizing the religious dimension of 
Confucianism, these modern thinkers are thus 
in continuity with an ancient tradition that allowed 
scholar-officials to take refuge in ultimate teachings via 
the “way of the Sage” whenever the “Kingly way” was 
not respected in the empire19.
This reinterpretation of the ancient cosmic order is 
nevertheless the work of a minority of intellectuals. Village 
people continue to remain faithful to the hierarchy of the 
ancient entities. Its contemporary interpretation, however, 
is at difficulties to express itself in modern language.
18 Other contemporary Confucians seems less sensitive to the risks of national 
symbolism. Lin Anwu林安梧, a well-known but heterodox disciple of Mou 
Zongsan in Taiwan, for his part responds thus: “I think that worshiping Heaven 
and Earth, the Ancestors and the Sages (or Saints) is entirely possible. In the past, 
one worshipped Heaven and Earth, the Sovereign, the Ancestors and the Masters. 
If one finds that sovereign is not acceptable, one can replace it with the state for we 
have today entered the democratic age, that of the sovereign state (guojun 國君): 
a Chinese must show loyalty towards his nation or towards his state. Obviously, 
some specify the series ‘Heaven, Earth, Saints, Ancestors, Masters’: Tang Junyi put 
it this way and Mou Zongsan adopted a similar formulation. The important thing 
is that Heaven and Earth, the ancestors and sages or saints are the three dimensions 
that traditional culture places at the heart of everyday life” (Lin Anwu 2012, 7). On 
Lin Anwu, cf. Makeham (2008), 171-187.
19 This relative de-politicization of the Confucian message among philosophers was 
contested by a generation of younger thinkers on the mainland who sought to 
restore its full political dimension to Confucianism in a constitutional order that 
would add to the people’s legitimacy that of Heaven and of history (that is, of the 
Chinese tradition). Its most prominent representative is Jian Qing 蔣慶: cf. Jiang 
(2012). From a Gentilian perspective, one might speak of a “politicization of 
religion”, except that it is a religion that is claiming to reconstruct itself.
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7. tHe aMbivalence oF PoPular beHavior
An anthropological study carried out by Hans 
Steinmüller in the 2000s in the province of Hubei offers 
a few insights into this ambiguous situation20. After the 
devastation of the Maoist period, a humble place for 
family worship was restored in the mail hall of houses 
and consisted of an offertory table or sometimes 
merely a shelf. There, tablets were largely replaced 
by lengths of red paper, upon which inscriptions were 
calligraphed on occasions such as the New Year. They 
are part of what the villagers of this region of Hubei 
call the family spirits or gods (jiashen 家神), a category 
that encompasses ancestral spirits, the household deity 
and Taoist or Buddhist-origin divinities (like Guanyin 
觀音).
It is a striking fact that the villagers generally did not 
refer to the innovations of the Republican period 
(placing the country or the state at the group’s center) 
when inscribing the five characters but rather kept the 
imperial formula, with its reference to the sovereign 
(jun). During the Maoist period, Mao Zedong’s 
effigy regularly occupied the sovereign’s place, a 
tradition that continues. One today observes a difficult 
coexistence between representations and attitudes 
relating to the imperial and Maoist imaginaries. For 
it is obviously possible to identify the sovereign in 
the inscription with either of them. Was Mao a new 
emperor21? In response to the enquiring ethnologist, 
a school teacher remarked: “It’s merely a matter of 
perspective. You can also interpret the jun character as 
representing President Hu Jintao or instead the State 
and Party”22. It is to be noted, moreover, that Mao’s 
power may confer additional value upon his portrait: 
that of warding off phantoms and evil demons23. 
The issue at stake here, however, is the coexistence 
of contradictory interpretations regarding politics is 
the coexistence at the center of family ritual space 
of contradictory interpretations regarding politics 
20  Hans Steinmüller (2010).
21  For an overview, cf. Barmé (2010).
22  Hans Steinmüller (2010), 82.
23  According to the rules of the cosmology discussed earlier, it is normal that Mao 
Zedong, like many deified generals, becomes a deity after his death due to his 
particular magic power (ling 靈). But he was not a god during his lifetime, 
despite Western representations of “the sun-like god Mao.” However, as a 
living human possessing a particular power, Mao could exercise his influence, 
not just in the visible world, but also in the invisible world of spirits. In the 
course of fieldwork I carried out in the late 1980s regarding religion in the 
district of Danxian 儋縣 (northwest of Hainan), I was astonished to find that the 
spectacular interactions between villagers and their family deities (particularly 
via the intermediary of a medium) had been nearly completely interrupted in 
the decade of the cultural Revolution. “It’s extremely simple,” I was told, “the 
gods knew that the emperor would not allow them to intervene in our affairs 
so they (temporarily) refrained [from doing so]”. The visible and invisible 
dimensions do not affect weakness and strength: the power of a particular 
human, whether he be emperor or a humble Taoist master, can be greater than 
that of minor spirits. This human power derives from an exceptional character, 
particular training or occupying a role in a ritual (the latter brings to mind what 
Max Weber referred to as Amtcharisma). Cf. Thoraval (1990), 139-143.
properly so-called. When submitted to an outsider’s 
gaze, this “equivocality” is the source of a specific 
form of embarrassment among the villagers, the 
manifestations of which Steinmüller seeks to analyze 
(silence, irony, etc.)24.
Although a particular gloss may be offered for each 
entity, the entirety of this sacred hierarchy taken as 
a whole must ultimately be taken into account. As 
historians and ethnologists have alike noted, the 
underlying order or structure of the series remains 
the same, even when its content is altered. For, under 
religiously defined conditions, the same script links 
this cosmic order via written characters governed 
by taboos asserting a magical dimension25. And this 
cosmic order is the site of regular interaction between 
the visible and invisible universes on the occasion of 
small offertory rituals, however humble they may be.
This is why, in the context of a generalized return to 
cultural practices on the part of the population, it is 
only by offering radical reinterpretations of this whole 
set of symbols and the cults associated with them that 
Party theoreticians and ideologues are today able to 
acknowledge their persistence in the village world. 
24  Despite the multiple euphemistic interpretations that surround the figure of the 
sovereign, the permanence of the figure of the emperor (huangdi 皇帝) in the 
popular imagination must be noted. The years that followed Maoism in the 1980s 
and 90s, in particular, witnessed the emergence of small peasant movements led 
by a charismatic figure. Having proclaimed himself emperor of a new dynasty, 
this figure sometimes attracted a large “court” of supporters before being repressed 
by the security services. By assuming the politico-religious role of the emperor 
reorganizing the world as son of Heaven, such figures, however marginal they may 
have been, testify to the vitality of certain cosmological representations. One thus 
witnessed the emergence of ephemeral post-Maoist “dynasties”: “The Emperor of 
the Golden Door of Virtue” (Daode jinmen huangdi 道德金門皇帝), an illiterate 
peasant who founded a sect in 1981 in the mountainous region between Hubei, 
Hunan and Anhui, repressed just ten years later; “The Luminous Empire of the 
Central Plain” (Zhongyuan huangqingguo 中原皇清國) in Hunan in 1982; the 
“Kingdom of Great Wisdom” (Dasheng wangchao 大圣王朝), led by an “empress” 
in Shandong in 1986-88; “the Celestial Kingdom of Prosperity” (Wanshun 
Tianguo 萬順天國) in Henan in 1990-92, etc. For an overview, cf. Zhang (2012). 
Geremie Barmé (2010, 266) briefly presents the case of the Buddhist Kingdom of 
Greater China (Dazhongguo foguo大中國佛國) in Hunan in 1976-1983 and 
the dissident writer Liao Yiwu 廖亦武 conversed with Zeng Yinglong 鄭應
龍, the dethroned emperor of a “Dynasty of Great Abundance” (Dayou 
huangchao大有皇朝) in 1985. Rendered possible by a peasant mobilization 
against birth control in Sichuan, the latter episode displayed – sometimes 
in tragi-comic fashion – all of the cosmic phenomena that accompany the 
emergence of a new dynasty (omens, meteorological phenomena, etc.), cf. 
Liao (2009), 50-58.
25  Thus, the manner in which these characters are written must be slightly modified 
to be considered ritually effective: the mouth, which is one component of 
the sovereign character (jun), must be left open and the same holds for the eye 
discerned in the ideogram of the ancestors (qin), etc. Cf. Xu Zi (2006).
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8. tHe coMMuniSt State: tHe 
ProbleMatic Secularization
A document on this subject by a Party official nicely 
captures the authorities’ present thinking on the 
issue26. It above all amounts to asserting that the 
homage paid to these entities is non-religious in 
nature (feizongjiao 非宗教) and may consequently 
play a useful role. In support of this position, the 
cult to the five entities is contrasted with the notion 
of religion as it is defined by the communist state 
in opposition to superstition27. According to a now 
classic argument, there are three reasons why the 
respect shown for this tablet cannot be compared 
to the attitude specific to the “three great world 
religions” (Christianity, Buddhism, Islam): such 
worship consists of an intra-worldly and rational 
attitude that addresses the objective world rather 
than transcendent ideas; it is a familial, everyday 
custom that requires neither organization nor 
specialists; finally, this custom displays none of 
the sectarian and exclusive attitudes characteristic 
of religion properly so-called. So what do these 
symbols express? Merely “the quintessence of the 
traditional culture of the Chinese people”. “This 
system of values,” it is claimed, “establishes a family 
ethic, the need to respect one’s elders and protect 
one’s juniors in human relations and so on. Since 
the reform era, China has endeavored to construct 
a socialist state with Chinese characteristics and 
these characteristics come from traditional culture 
once what is still valuable has been separated from 
what needs to be discarded.” The tablet represents 
an eminent culture and “the reverential homage 
paid it by the population deserves praise” for it can 
contribute to the harmonious society promoted by 
the government.
In short, since one cannot remove a given entity 
from the group that confers sense upon it, one must 
pretend to give the latter an exclusively natural and 
human meaning. This requires closing one’s eyes 
to the practical attitudes that continue to animate 
inform popular behavior. In reality, the hierarchy 
ritually venerated by the population entirely 
reflects the interpenetration and interaction among 
the visible and invisible dimensions (yin and yang) 
of Chinese cosmology. Heaven and Earth do not 
refer to the natural environment but are above all 
the sites of forces jointly determining individual 
and collective destiny. With help from techniques 
of geomancy and divination, village populations 
set great stock by this. Similarly, the dimension of 
kinship (qin 親) is not just an expression of family 
26  Anonymous (2007).
27 On the age-old discussion regarding the application of the Western concept of 
religion to China, see Goossaert, Palmer (2011).
values useful to society but above all a symbol of 
the necessary solidarity – expressed via the ritual 
exchanges required by ancestor worship – between 
living family members and their predecessors-
become-spirits.
At this local level, the modern ideology propagated 
by the machinery of the state produces a violent 
rupture or discontinuity that generates equivocal 
attitudes: public silence or double talk.
9. Modern State cultS and ancient 
coSMology
Having presented the cult to the five entities in this 
way, one is of course in no position to directly respond 
to the question raised regarding the existence of a 
civil religion. For doing so requires one to take into 
account the state’s role in symbolically regulating 
the entire political community.
Today, the five entities, from Heaven to the Masters 
or Sages, are above all venerated in rural contexts 
and within the domestic sphere. It should be 
noted, however, that, prior to the Republican 
period (and sometimes still in its early 
days), this sacred cosmology had 
spread to the entire space of the All-
under-Heaven (Tianxia 天下) – that is, 
the Empire and everywhere else in what was 
considered the civilized world. The ritual logic 
or grammar that may today be observed at this 
very local level is identical to that practiced under 
the authority of the imperial state. What one may 
refer to as “continuism” simultaneously governed 
the various degrees of the socio-cosmic order and 
the two dimensions – visible and invisible, yin and 
yang – upon which its dynamic or operation was 
based.
Today, this logic is more readily observable at the 
microscopic scale (in bodily practices, for example, 
which inextricably associate what appears as 
belonging to the material or spiritual domains)28. It 
is also expressed in social practices at a wide variety 
of scales: in the society of modern, democratic 
Taiwan, to give just one example, demands in the 
area of justice continue to make themselves heard in 
what Paul Katz describes as a “judicial continuum” 
joining the judgment of men (in courts) with that of 
the gods (in temples)29. When one turns to consider 
the macrocosmic dimension of the ancient universe, 
however, it becomes clear that any such continuism 
28  See the short table prepared by Palmer (2011) 99.
29  Cf. Katz (2008).
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has been shattered. The creation of modern state 
machines – first nationalist then communist – 
seems to have definitively broken the continuity 
that formerly existed between the order of the 
sovereign and that of Heaven. Both states – that of 
the mainland and that of the island – lay theoretical 
claim to democratic legitimacy and recognize 
religious freedom in principle (if not in fact). In 
formal terms, then, it seems possible that a more 
or less authoritarian or liberal civil religion could 
marginalize ancient ritual practices, replacing them 
with sacralized political entities such as the nation 
(understood in various ways, of course).
Yet, without disproving this diagnosis, the record of 
state religions worshipping traditionally sacred 
entities allows one to qualify it. With the exception of 
short interruptions such as the radical Maoist period, 
states dominated by nationalist or communist parties 
continued to officially worship the Sage Confucius 
or the mythical Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黄帝) 
throughout the twentieth-century. These consisted 
of ancient “middle sacrifices” from the imperial 
period that modern ideology sought to reduce to the 
dimension of the visible world by endeavoring to 
transform the ancient sacrificial practice into an act 
of political commemoration. This is not the place 
to discuss the complexity of these practices, which 
have been studied elsewhere30. Rather, I shall 
content myself with a few brief remarks.
Here, it is useful to contrast properly religious 
rituals with political ceremonials. In the course 
of a sacrificial-type ritual, the former bring living 
people face to face with spirits (including that of 
Confucius). The latter, by contrast, are at great 
pains to ensure that the ceremony is confined to 
the visible world. Such is the case, for example, of 
the communist authorities’ worship of Confucius 
at Qufu曲阜 in Shangdong Province. But a sort of 
reciprocal contamination sometimes takes between 
these two major types and this is worth examining 
in detail. In the case of the mainland’s state cults 
(guoji 國祭), one thus notes the existence of rituals 
performed in a more humble fashion by common 
people, as if in parallel to official ceremonies: such 
is the case in Huangling 黃陵 (Shaanxi) for the 
Yellow Emperor and in Shandong for Confucius and 
his disciples. It is as if, contrary to what one might 
have expected, the modern state’s efforts to sideline 
ancient practices have not been reflected in a great 
divide separating a profane order now managed by 
politics from a sacred order freed of its intra-wordly 
dimensions, with immanence in this world reserved 
for the authorities while transcendence and a belief 
in spirits continue to be the preserve of the people. 
30  See Billioud, Thoraval (2014), 313-337.
This is not what happens, however. Religious 
rituals have not become merely religious. Instead, 
they continue to serve as vehicles for the entirety 
of the cosmic dynamism, from the humble level of 
the individual body to the most distant horizons of 
the cosmos. One and the same logic continues to 
exert itself: the universe, in miniature, is there in its 
entirety. As in the case of the five entities discussed 
above, in other words, a ritual that has become 
merely “popular” is not mutilated or broken by the 
supposedly secular environment. It remains the 
same, though the scale at which it is practiced has 
changed, and the potential for its display ultimately 
only depends on circumstances.
It will be said that this nevertheless amounts to a 
form of coexistence that respects the relative 
independence of the two orders, which it would 
not be wholly inappropriate to respectively call 
political and religious. This is doubtless so. But 
the frontier (more easily discernible by European 
dualisms) remains porous here. What is one to make 
of a 2011 ceremony held in Taipei to commemorate 
the hundredth anniversary of the Republic of 
China in the context of the spatio-temporal space 
of a sacrifice to Heaven (jitian 祭天)? There, the 
highest authorities of the Taiwanese state 
conducted a political ceremony that was 
completely inserted into a ritual system 
of a sacrificial nature31.
10. concluSion
The very limited intention of the present remarks 
should now be clear. On the basis of a general 
comparativist framework rendered desirable and 
even necessary for pragmatic reasons, I have sought 
to draw out the particular significance of regional 
ontologies in very specific circumstances. These 
ontologies have now been impacted and hybridized 
by the global processes studied by sociology. But a 
consideration of that which still resists comparative 
interpretation in globalized communication may in 
turn allow one to bring a critical gaze to bear on the 
contemporary destinies of the politics as religion.
31  For a description of this hybrid ceremony, see Billioud, Thoraval (2014), 343-
353.
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